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Abstract: This paper intends to understand the major institutional factors related to
the economic development of the European Union (EU) countries in the last two
decades. It provides some contributions to the institutionalist debate of the present
crisis of the European Union, and within it, the Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU). The two main issues of the empirical research are the effect of the different
institutions on economic growth and the relative importance of institutions compared
with the traditional macroeconomic components of economic development. The
institutionalist traditions of comparative political science and political economy as
well as institutional economics define the framework of interpretation. The analysis 
sheds some light on the relationship between economic development and the
different institutional dimensions, namely the legal environment, political institutions,
public policy institutions (governance) and the informal institutions, the cultural
components of the economic-political behaviour. The empirical research examines 
the development pattern of the European Union countries between 1993 and 2011
as well as the relationship between economic development and institutional quality 
in that period by descriptive and explanatory statistical methods. The results reveal
strong relationship among the different aspects of institutional quality in the EU
countries; within Europe we cannot observe a Singaporean type contradictory 
constellation between the quality of democratic institutions and public policy 
effectiveness. The path of European development has been drawing a
conspicuously strong correlation among the different institutional dimensions: the
high quality of democratic institutions, the respect of the rule of law and property
rights and the effective governance are going hand in hand with the growth-
supporting components of the culture. In cultural terms, the high level of trust,
respect and self-determination as well as the lack of obedience ensure the most
successful long-term growth pattern in Europe. Another important finding is that the
EMU countries are conspicuously heterogeneous in their institutional quality and the
Mediterranean members of the Euro area are institutionally closer to the non-EMU-
member Central-Eastern European countries than the core EMU countries.
Concerning the economic policy consequences, the heterogeneity of the informal
institutions fundamentally challenges the effectiveness of the approach of stronger 
harmonisation by stricter formal rules and stricter sanctions against the norm-
breaking Euro area members.
Keywords: economic development; European Union; Euro area; institutions;
culture, democracy
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1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) is in deep crisis; at the moment there is no serious 
professional or internationally respected public figure who can debate it. In mere
economic sense it is obvious that the global financial crisis has implied a debt crisis 
and a subsequent long-lasting recession in several countries of the EU. At the
beginning of 2013 it seems that the European Union as an actor in itself has more
difficulties in managing the crisis than other developed regions of the world.
Moreover, it is already doubtful whether the EU, and within it especially the group of
the countries using the common currency, the Euro (the Economic and Monetary 
Union, EMU) will be able to survive this crisis without losing some of its members.
Indeed, the EMU (and also the entire EU) is seriously endangered as a political
construction, at least in its present form (Habermas 2012).
Most of the policy suggestions presented as ‘solutions’ of the present crisis explicitly 
or implicitly derive from the diagnosis that the problem is ultimately the weakness of
fiscal federalism in Europe. Briefly, the mainstream approach is that the Eurozone
can be saved only if decision-making is federalized (Darvas 2010); the efficient
management of the present crisis of the EMU requires stricter rules as well as stricter 
sanctions against the norm-breaking countries (Hodson 2012). It is noteworthy that
even those who debate this therapy accept the ‘federalism problem’: the typical
counter-arguments point to the problems of legitimacy of the EU institutions, the
contradictory nature of sovereignty within the EU, and the problems of the European
identity, the lack of a European ‘demos’ (Cederman 2001, Schimmelfennig 2010).
But these problems have already been well-debated several times, among others,
nine years ago when a big-bang enlargement happened (see the overview of
Körösényi, 2004 about that). Logically, the absence of a strong common European
identity implies a relatively weak solidarity potential towards other EU nations: the
willingness of support for bailout purposes in a time of an enduring crisis is moderate
– incomparable for example with the quasi-automatic solidarity of West-German
citizens and politicians towards East-Germany in the decade after the German
reunification (Dochartaigh 2010).
In this paper I intend to open the black-box of the European institutions. By stepping
out from the federalism debate frame, I interpret the development of the European
economies in the last two decades from a deeper institutionalist perspective that
integrate the recent theoretical and empirical findings of new institutionalism in
political science as well as in comparative macroeconomics.
The next section briefly deals with the potentially relevant institutional approaches in
the context of the EU countries’ development. Section 3 analyzes empirically the
economic and institutional development of the EU and EMU countries between 1993
and 2011. The final section presents the concluding remarks and discussion.
2. Institutional development and economic growth
The institutionalist perspective has recently become integrated in the main streams 
of the different social sciences. In the political science the expansion of new
institutionalism started in the eighties (Peters, 2005:16). In organisational sociology,
the revival of the ‘embeddedness’ approach of Polányi (1957) in the seminal paper 
of Granovetter (1985) implied a culturalist research perspective: the role of values 
and norms in the working of organisations became a new research programme in
the nineties (DiMaggio, 1990). Moreover, the institutionalist approach is obviously
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important in economics as it was already part of the classical school (Smith,
1899[1776]). However, the specific institutional explanations of the basic question of
growth theory (why some countries are rich and why are others poor), has only come
back into the mainstream in the last two or three decades when the new growth
theory approach integrated the major results of institutionalist economics (Helpman
2004, Czeglédi 2006).
2.1. Growth and institutional quality in the European Union
The European Union and especially the Economic and Monetary Union as one of its
enhanced institutionalist cooperation projects has followed the logic of pro-active
institution-building: the less developed countries of the community are supposed to
incorporate the ‘good’ formal institutions of the most developed ones. Theoretically
the EU and again, especially the EMU is supposed to be a convergence club
(Baumol, 1986): the criteria of entrance select among the aspirants, and the applied
new rules and organisations (in terms of North 1990: the formal institutions) will help
the less developed countries to gradually converge towards the more developed
ones. However, the imitation of the ‘best’ formal institutions has not necessarily 
implied a convergence in economic development. In this context, the literature
suggests four potential institutional factors of economic development (Bartha, 2012):
(a) the legal institutions, (b) the political institutions, (c) the institutions of governance
(professional bureaucracy, public policy expertise) and (d) the informal institutions 
(values and norms orienting the behaviour of political and economic actors).
2.2. Research questions and hypothesis
This paper attempts to answer two main questions: (1) What is the effect of the
different institutions on economic growth in the EU and the EMU countries? (2) What
are the relative importance of the different types of institutions compared to each
other and the traditional macroeconomic variables? The hypothesis to be tested here
is the following: as the last two decades of the European development was 
characterized by an increasing convergence in the formal (legal and political) 
institutions, the stubborn differences in economic development levels are mainly 
caused by the differences in informal institutions and governance.
3. Empirical research
3.1. Variables, operationalization
The growth accounting framework is the starting point for the empirical research;
namely the augmented Solow model (Mankiw et al. 1992:408) that among the
explanatory variables of growth includes the accumulation of human capital as well
(in addition to physical capital and labour). In this context, the role of institutions is
reflected by the unobserved total factor productivity (TFP), as a country’s total factor 
productivity ‘is a function of the country’s policies and institutions’ (Parente 2001:56).
Consequently, the different (legal, political, policy and cultural) institutional
approaches are rival specifications of the TFP residual in the growth accounting.
3.1.1. Dependent variable
The dependent variable chosen for this research is economic growth. The indicator 
is the change in GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity between 1993 and 2011.
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The source of these data (as also for other macroeconomic data) is the Penn World
Table 7.0 (Heston et al., 2011) database for 1993-2009; the values for 2009-2011 
are extrapolations based on Eurostat data.
3.1.2. Independent variables
Macroeconomic variables
The independent variables are specified in the framework of conditional
convergence (Barro- Sala-i-Martin, 1992:226). The first independent variable is the
level of economic development (GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Parity) in
1993. If the quality of institutions does not play a major role in long-term economic 
growth, this variable basically defines the trends: the poorer countries should
gradually but steadily converge towards the most developed ones.
The next independent variable is the change in physical capital; the proxy of it,
following the international practice, is the investment/GDP ratio. The change of
labour is measured by the average change in the number of people employed, the
technological change and the amortisation (a negligible factor in the present
analysis) are supposed to be 0.05 (an international convention since the seminal
paper of Mankiw et al., 1992).
I have used a less conventional indicator for the proxy of human capital investment. 
Among others, van Leeuwen and Földvári (2008) revealed that when we compare
the EU countries, the use of the conventional ‘average years of education’ proxy
overvalues the human capital of the Central-Eastern European countries. Therefore
I have applied as a proxy of human capital investment the indicator of ‘cognitive
skills’ developed by Hanushek and Woesmann (2009), although with some
modification. Their ‘cognitive skills’ indicator is derived from the OECD Programme
for International Student Assessment (PISA) survey: cognitive skills are “measured
by the simple average of all observed math and science scores between 1964 and
2003 for each country” (Hanushek and Woesmann, 2009:8), it is probably biased
somewhat against the literacy skills. Consequently, I have also included the simple
average of all observed literacy skills scores; this ‘cognitive and literacy skills’ is the
proxy of human capital investment used for each of the European countries.
Institutional variables
I have operationalized four different institutional type variables from different
international surveys. The proxy of the Northian formal institutions is the sub-index
of Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights from the 2011 Annual Report of
the Economic Freedom of the World from the Cato Institute (Gwartney et al., 2011).
The proxy of the Northian informal institutions, i.e. the cultural components guiding
the behaviour of the economic and political actors comes from the ‘culture’ principal
component of Williamson and Mathers (2010). The authors constructed the values
of this culture principal component from the different data collection waves of the
World Values Survey; according to their interpretation, trust, self-determination and 
respect are positive correlates of the economic development, while the obedience is
a negative component of that. The proxy of the quality of democracy, the quality of
political institutions comes from the democracy index of the Economist Intelligence
Unit. This index involves the quality aspect of the democracy (Ringen, 2011); in
addition, we have values for all of the EU member states for several measurement
periods. Finally, the proxy of the governance, the quality of expert-bureaucratic 
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institutions comes from the World Bank “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)” 
project (Kauffmann et al., 2010) the sub-index of government efficiency was selected
for this. By using long-term average values for all of the four institutional proxies I
followed the international conventions.
3.2. Main findings
3.2.1. Institutional relations between legal institutions, democracy,
governance and culture
The comparison of the relative standard deviations (see Table 1) supports our
hypothesis: among the 26 European Union member countries, the most important
differences can be registered in the informal institutions. However, the smallest
differences are in the quality of democracy, while in the legal institutions and the
quality of governance we find more significant differences (but less significant ones
than in the dimension of culture).
Table 1: The heterogeneity of institutional indicators
LEGAL CULTURE GOVERN DEMOC
Standard deviation 1.18 1.80 12.99 0.79
Means 7.32 5.24 73.50 8.06
Relative standard
deviation 16.15 34.34 17.68 9.75
Sources: LEGAL (Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights): Cato Institute,
Gwartney et al., 2011; CULTURE: Williamson and Mathers (2010); GOVERN
(Government Effectiveness): World Bank “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)” 
project (Kauffmann et al., 2010); DEMOC (Democracy), Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy Index
Nevertheless, it would be misleading to draw a conclusion of ‘incompatibility’
between democracy and culture in the EU. The correlation matrix of the four 
institutional variables reveal a strong relationship: the bi-variate correlation is
significant at a 0.01 probability level between each of the four variables.
Table 2: Correlation between institutional factors
LEGAL CULTURE GOVERN DEMOC
LEGAL 1.00 0.72 0.93 0.86
CULTURE 0.72 1.00 0.69 0.82
GOVERN 0.93 0.69 1.00 0.89
DEMOC 0.86 0.82 0.89 1.00
Sources: LEGAL (Legal Structure and Security of Property Rights): Cato Institute,
Gwartney et al., 2011; CULTURE: Williamson and Mathers (2010); GOVERN
(Government Effectiveness): World Bank “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)” 
project (Kauffmann et al., 2010); DEMOC (Democracy), Economist Intelligence Unit
Democracy Index
The quality of democracy correlates strongly with all of the three other dimensions,
but the strongest statistical relationship (93%!) can be registered between the
government effectiveness and the legal structure. These findings indicate that the
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Lee-thesis, the assumed Singaporean type contradiction between democracy and
government effectiveness is not valid in the EU on the long-run (for more criticism 
about the Lee-thesis see: Knutsen, 2010); either the quality of democracy or the
government effectiveness is the strongest in the Nordic countries, while Bulgaria and
Romania are the laggards in both aspects (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Quality of democracy and government effectiveness in the EU
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit and the World Bank
Consequently, it requires a specific methodological treatment to minimize the
obvious endogeneity and multicollinearity problems: we have to include a common
factor of institutional development in our explanatory models (and not four different
institutional variables). The principal component analysis derives one principal
component from the four institutional dimensions that explain 86.5% of the variance
of the original institutional variables. The strong relationship between this 
constructed institutional development component and the economic development
level supports our interpretation about the underlying institutional factors behind the
seemingly economic problems of the European integration. Figure 2 regarding the
EU member countries’ economic and institutional development obviously indicates
that the Economic and Monetary Union is not the club of the most developed
European countries; neither in economic, nor in institutional development terms. Not
only because the institutionally two most developed countries of the EU (Sweden
and Denmark) are not members of the EMU, but also because of the apparent
weaknesses of the Mediterranean countries’ institutions.
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Figure 2: Institutional and economic development in the European Union
Sources: Penn World Table 7.0 and calculations by author
Among other things, our institutional data indicate that one founding member, Italy
is more like the two countries that joined the EU only five years ago (Bulgaria and
Romania), than Sweden (the institutionally most developed EU member). It is also
noteworthy that the institutional development level of France is only around the EU
average and it is significantly weaker than that of Germany; paradoxically, in addition
to Austria, the institutional development level of Germany is the closest to that of
Ireland and the United Kingdom. Though there are several arguments that multiple
development clubs are forming within the EU in the spirit of differentiated integration
(Koller, 2012), it is doubtful that the EMU can be considered an outstanding
development club of enhanced financial cooperation. This is not true in economic 
terms; it is even less true in institutional development terms. Moreover, because
neither the Czech Republic, nor the United Kingdom are EMU members, it is not
even true that the common currency area concentrates the EU average countries in
economic and institutional development terms.
The hierarchical clustering process of the institutional dimensions draws three sub-
groups among the more developed EU countries: the three Nordic states and the 
Netherlands form the group of the most developed countries; Germany, Austria,
Ireland and the United Kingdom constitute a second group, while France, Belgium
and Spain are on the margin of the more developed EU countries. The institutionally 
less developed Southern and Eastern EU member countries are positioned along a
continuum; only Bulgaria and Romania form a separate cluster.
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3.2.2. Economic development: institutional and other explanations
I would like to reflect briefly on the weight of institutional and other explanations in
economic development. Though the initial development level (in this analysis in
1993) correlates significantly and negatively with the economic growth in the last two
decades, the moderate value of the determination coefficient (0.58) conforms with
our expectations, that is, the more refined explanations can have empirical relevance
in the development of the EU countries. The inclusion of our institutional
development principal component significantly increases the explanatory force: in
this model the value of the adjusted R2 is 0.65. However, in a technical sense, our
institutionalist explanation is weaker than the human-capital-augmented Solow
model (the adjusted R2 increases to 0.76). Indeed, the human capital seems to be
the decisive factor (besides the initial development differences). Nevertheless, this 
does not mean that we have to neglect the institutional effects in interpreting the
economic development of the EU countries; the novelty of our human capital
investment proxy is precisely the inclusion of the labour market adaptability 
dimension in the educational variable that means an implicit incorporation of the
institutions, especially the informal institutions.
4. Conclusion and discussion
This paper presented an institutional, comparative political economy perspective for 
the EU countries’ growth patterns; it also offered the institutional heterogeneity thesis 
in framing the enduring crisis of the EU and the Economic and Monetary Union. Four 
potential institutional explanations of long-term growth were operationalized: the
formal institutions by the legal structure, the Northian informal institutions by the
cultural components guiding the behaviour of actors, the political institutions by the
quality of democracy, and the bureaucratic-expert institutions by the quality of
governance.
The expectation of the empirical research was that the formal institutional
resemblance of the EU and especially the EMU countries is in sharp contrast with
the stubborn and significant differences along the dimensions of the governance and
the cultural components. However, the empirical findings are not undoubtedly 
supporting this hypothesis. In fact, the path of European development draws a strong
correlation among the different institutional dimensions: the high quality of
democratic institutions, the good legal structure, the efficient government and the
supporting components of culture (trust, respect and self-determination and the lack 
of obedience) are going hand in hand.
This implies that the present crisis of the Eurozone is not mainly economic in nature,
and it is not predominantly the problem of the supposed bad governance of the
South-European political elites. The root of the political crisis comes from the much
deeper institutional heterogeneity; concerning their institutions, the older Southern 
EU member states are much more like the new Eastern-Central EU member 
countries than the institutionally most developed Nordic ones. Because of the
endogenous nature of this institutional heterogeneity, the stricter rules and the 
stricter sanctions against the norm-breaking countries are unlikely to solve the crisis
and preserve the survival of the Eurozone in its present form. The best case scenario
is a slow, gradual convergence when the constant human capital improvement of
the less developed EU and EMU countries imply a self-reinforcing improvement in
the legal and political institutions, governance and the cultural components guiding
the behavioural patterns of economic and political actors.
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Why can we observe these conspicuously strong relations between the different
institutional aspects in Europe in the last two decades? One possible explanation
derives from the global interconnectedness, the increased role of perception of the
global financial and capital markets. Practically all of the EU member countries
depend basically on the external perception, but they depend independently (and
not together as the EU or the EMU). The country risk premiums are obviously
country-specific ones, and they reveal the global intuitive perception of the major 
financial and capital market players about the economic and institutional
development prospects of the individual countries. The presented strong institutional
heterogeneity within the EU and the EMU shed some light on the enduring European
crisis, nevertheless these findings are rather preliminary, and should be tested by 
more subtle indicators and on longer time periods as well.
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